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Abstract
We report on the nature of a utility optimizing transfer from
one regional govenment to another when local public goods are
present. Computer examples reveal that small di⁄erences in re-
gional endowments result in large di⁄erences in equilibrium out-
comes for two regions, under optimal transfers. The scale e⁄ect
(lower tax charge per person for the same public good in more
populous regions) leads to the small region generally providing
transfers to the larger region.
￿ Key words: intergovenmental transfers, local public goods,
inter-regional resource allocation
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1 Introduction
We return to the matter of transfers from one regional government, with
its own local public good, to another being carried out in order to counter
sub-optimal, "free market" interregional resource allocation (Flatters,
Henderson and Miezkowski [1974]); as for example, manifested by similar
workers migrating to the "wrong" region. In fairly straightforward com-
puter examples, we observe that a nominally "small", poorly endowed
region can end up making a positive transfer to a large, seemingly well
endowed region. Our result turns on two things: utility equalization by
the costless migration of like workers can occur with considerable sub-
stitution of private consumption goods for local public goods across by
1individuals in distinct regions (in equilibrium, the per capita consump-
tion of the local public good in one region can di⁄er considerably in
magnitude from that in another region) and secondly, the scale e⁄ect
of reducing per capita charges for the local public good in a region by
"adding" households can be large. This latter e⁄ect seems to drive our
"reverse" transfer result (the "small", "poor" region making a transfer
to the larger, seemingly better endowed region). Our transfers are made
costlessly to each household in the receiving region.
There is no strategic play by local governments in our analysis. Hence
our transfers do not neutralize potential strategic tax responses by a local
government as in Kothenburger [2002] and Bucovetsky and Smart [2007].
And our transfers are not tailored to equalize per capita ￿scal capacities
as in Boadway1 [2004; pp. 228-231]; nor are our transfers designed to
equalize utility levels under the maximization of a Benthamite social
welfare function (Hartwick [1980]). Our optimal transfer is not then a
vehicle for compensating a region, poorly endowed with land, for its small
endowment; rather the transfer is acting as an instrument for extending
the scale e⁄ect in the provision of a local public good to a region with
more taxpayers. The transfer follows from a large scale e⁄ect and also
more welfare at the margin for our two region economy. We assume
that free migration is equalizing utility levels for like migrants across
regions and simply look into the size of transfers that will maximize
the utility of a representative migrant. The optimal transfers do of
course a⁄ect the equilibrium population distribution and allocation of
K￿capital between any two regions and that is their role, as in Flatters,
1A sub-component of interprovincial transfers in Canada are equalization pay-
ments, ￿ ows to a provincial government designed to raise the per capita "￿scal ca-
pacity" of a lower income province. The equalization payments are funded with
transfers from a pool of revenue based on taxes from all provinces but in fact turn
out to be transfers from higher income provinces to lower income provinces. The
payments are intended to assure "reasonably comparable levels" of health care, ed-
ucation, and welfare in all the provinces. In 2009-2010, the total amount of the
program was roughly 14.2 billion Canadian dollars.
2et. al. [1974]2. Our contribution serves to emphasize that a system of
inter-regional transfers can be tailored to meet a variety of objectives
and these objectives may well con￿ ict with each other. The fact that
di⁄erent objectives are in general associated with di⁄erent designs of
transfer schemes serves to alert us to the importance of being very clear
in what each of us is doing: the real world has an abundance of systems
of intergovernmental transfers and good design of a transfer system is
itself a worthy objective.
Following Flatters, et. al. we invoke the Samuelson condition for
determining the size of the public good in each region. We are of course
able to "retrieve" the well-known optimal population condition: fund
the local public good with local rentals. In our model however rentals
include those from K ￿capital as well as land and the classical optimal
population condition needs to be supplemented with the optimal trans-
fer condition in order for the classic funding result of Flatters et. al. to
appear. For an "arbitrary" overall population, our optimal transfer con-
dition is: the di⁄erence is total per capita rentals between regions must
equal the di⁄erence in, net of per capita transfer, per capita tax charges
between regions. In other words, the di⁄erence in per capita rentals be-
tween regions is capitalizing the di⁄erence in per capita net tax charges
between regions. Relative ￿scal capacity is showing up in the di⁄erence
between per capita rentals in the two regions. In our simulations, our
smaller region emerges with the "stronger" per capita ￿scal capacity and
ends up funding the transfer ￿ owing to the larger region. We observe
that the transfer is larger the more substitutability we allow in the pro-
duction function and turns out to be larger, the smaller is the di⁄erence
in the initial endowment of land to the two regions. In a purely private
2Mansoorian and Myers ([1993] and [1997]) have regions (governments are de￿ned
implicitly) play Nash strategies with respect to transfer setting and consider the
question of a best resource allocation across regions. They do not have local public
goods in their model.
3goods two region economy (eg. Mansoorian and Myers [1993] and [1997])
we ￿nd that the characterization of the optimal transfer is very similar.
Per capita liability for "taxes" is simply the transfer (there is no charge
for a local public good) and per capita ￿scal capacity continues to take
the form of per capita rentals.
2 The Two Region Equilibrium
We have three inputs in each region: a ￿xed amount of labor to be
spread over the two regions, a ￿xed amount of produced capital K to be
spread over the two regions and a natural resource stock, say land, T i;
￿xed in supply in each region. A superscript denotes a region. Assuming
a transfer S given and free mobility of workers equalizing utility levels
across the two regions, our equilibrium system is six equations:
U(
F(N1;K1;T 1) ￿ G1 ￿ S
N1 ;G
1) = U(




where U(:;:) is our positive-valued utility, increasing and concave in each
argument, with U(0;x) = U(y;0) = 0 for x and y positive values. When
a person enters region i he or she immediately begins receiving an equal
share of the local capital rent and land rent. This in a sense deprives cur-
rent residents of some income. In addition we assume that the regional
government in each region produces the respective government good in




where UC1 indicates the derivative of the utility function with respect
to the ￿rst argument, namely C1; and so on for the other derivatives.
4Produced capital is "spread" across the two regions to satisfy
FK1 = FK2: (4)







This is a six equation system in G1;G2;N1;N2;K1 and K2:






N1 = C1 + G1





N2 = C2 + G2
N2: In region 1, w1 = FN1 and in region
2, w2 = FN2: An entrant to a region automatically loses possession of
any capital income from the region she departed from and becomes the
recipient of an equal per capita share of capital income KiFKi + T iFTi
for the region she is settling in. She also is liable for an equal per capita
share of the transfer that her region is sending out. We comment more
on the matter of the ownership of capital below.
3 The Utility Maximizing Value for S
Once we have solved our six equation system ((1) to (6)), we can in
principle express each of G1;G2;N1;N2;K1 and K2 in terms of the
current value of transfer S: One then asks for a value of S that re-
sults in each of U(C1;G1) and U(C2;G2) being a maximum, subject
to G1(S);G2(S);N1(S);N2(S);K1(S) and K2(S) satisfying the equi-
librium system. We simply maximize each of U(C1(S);G1(S)) and
U(C2(S);G2(S)) with respect to S; using equilibrium conditions: The
optimizations yield
UC1



























dS ; we can substitute and sum









dN1: Since we have the equalibrium condition, FK1 = FK2:
This reduces to
[FN1 ￿ C
1] = [FN2 ￿ C
2] (9)
(9) is the equation for the optimal value of transfer S: This suggests
that free migration is not equalizing wages across the two regions, but a
particular sort of net wage. We comment more on the absence of wage
equalization below.
The sign of each di⁄erence in (9) will be the same and the sign turns
on, for our purposes at least, the magnitude of N; aggregate population.
Our new system of equations (1) to (6) plus (9) is now seven equations in
G1;G2;N1;N2;K1; K2 and S: If we express F(N1;K1;T 1) as N1FN1 +
K1FK1 + R1 (R1 = T 1FT1 for the case of constant returns to scale)
and F(N2;K2;T 2) as N2FN2 +K2FK2 +R2 (R2 = T 2FT2 for the case of
constant returns to scale) and recall that C1N1+G1+S = F(N1;K1;T 1)
and C2N2 +G2 ￿S = F(N2;K2;T 2); then the condition for an optimal
S in (9) implies that
[
G1 + S







(10) indicates that the di⁄erence is net tax obligations for an individual
in the two regions, namely [G1+S
N1 ] ￿ [G2￿S
N2 ]; equals the di⁄erence in per
capita rentals, where the latter includes rent from K ￿ capital.
In the absence of K capital in the model,3 (9) is still [FN1 ￿ C1] =
[FN2 ￿ C2] but (10) reduces to
[
G1 + S







3Our two production functions are F(N1;T1) and F(N2;T2) for this less com-
plicated set up.
64 Simulation Results
We proceeded to solve our six equation system for N1; K1 and U(C1;G1)
(= U(C2;G2)) for various values of S; given a Cobb-Douglas speci￿cation
for the utility function and a more general CES speci￿cation for the
production function, the same, in each region. For U(:;:) ￿ [Ci]￿[Gi]1￿￿
our six equation system (the "arbitrary" S case) reduces to two equations
in N1 and K1: That is, for N2 = 20 ￿ N1 and K2 = 8 ￿ K1; our six
equation system becomes
F(N2;K2;T 2) + S






and FK1 = FK2




For the case of S optimal, we had the option of varying S over a
grid and selecting the value of S for utility a maximum or of solving the
seven equation system with S endogenous. This seven equation system,
with S endogenous, reduced to the three equation system
F(N2;K2;T 2) + S






and FK1 = FK2
and FN1 ￿ C
1 =FN2 ￿ C
2:
For this three equation system, we could solve for S in the ￿rst equation





N2 ) to have two non-linear equations in two
unknowns. Each of our two non-linear equation systems (one with S
exogenous and one with S endogenous) solved readily with Matlab.
Our ￿rst case has the elasticity in the CES production function at




5(T i)￿￿]￿1=￿ and the utility function is (Ci)3=4(Gi)1=4: Total
population is given as N = 20 and total capital as K = 8: Region 1 has
T 1 = 4 and region 2 has T 2 = 2:
Table 1
7S U N1 K1 G1 G2 C1 C2 FN1 FN2
-0.05 0.4605 14.9653 5.5040 1.5456 0.6828 0.3098 0.4068 0.0672 0.1220
-0.2 0.46425 15.5985 5.5868 1.5985 0.6189 0.3074 0.4218 0.0631 0.1478
-0.3975 0.46503 16.5064 5.7347 1.6706 0.5213 0.3036 0.4477 0.0580 0.2020
The striking result for this simulation is that the "small" region (T 2 is
smaller than T 1) is making a positive transfer to the larger region when
the transfer has been optimized (at S = ￿0:3975). If we think here of
per capita rentals signalling "￿scal capacity", we indeed observe that for
S optimal the smaller region has per capita K rentals of 0:1558 compared
to the value of 0:0835 for region 1 and again, the smaller region has per
capita T rentals of 0:3529 compared to the value of 0:2393 for region 1.
At S optimal, region 1 has attracted more than 80% of the labor and
more than 70% of the mobile K: These large ex post "endowments" still
do not yield a higher per capita land rent in region 1 or higher per capita
rentals for K ￿ capital: The wage in region 1 is less than 1/3 of that in
region 24 and public good per capita in region 1 is more than ￿ve times
the amount in region 2. For Gi=N1 as per capita payment for the local
public good, a person in region 1 has about 2/3 the payment of a person
in region 2 (0.101 compared with 0.15). Region 1 is roughly speaking
the low tax, public good abundant region.
We note that the values for per capita utility are close together for
our various values of S: Hence for our parameters, a mis-setting of S
is not a costly welfare mistake, provided the selected value is not too
distant from the optimal value.
For our other experiments, the elasticity in the production function
4It is quite standard in spatial economics to have similar workers in di⁄erent
locations earn quite di⁄erent wages. For example Ciccone and Hall [1996] analyze
the very di⁄erent labor productivity measures of similar workers across counties in
the United States. They ￿nd that worker density works well in explaining the wide
range of productivities. High wage cities are not only high productivity cities but
they are also high housing cost cities. The high housing costs are capitalizing in land
values the productivity premia exhibited by certain, typically large, cities. Glaeser
and Mare [2001] analyze wage di⁄erences for similar workers across cities in the
United States.
8was varied toward more elastic. See Table 2. As ￿ was selected smaller,
the size of the transfer from region 2 to region 1 increased and the labor
and K ￿ capital resources in region 1 increased. There was a smooth
transition in these "trends" over the elasticity at unity, (￿ = 0):5 Observe
also that more elasticity in production (￿ smaller) goes along with a
higher utility level for people in the two regions.
Table 2
￿ S N1 K1 Utility
0.5 -0.36489 17.1645 6.0389 0.497782
0.125 -0.39282 18.5400 6.6361 0.531090
-0.05 -0.39597 19.2811 7.0464 0.551595
The "reverse" transfer phenomenon (region with larger T i is the re-
ceiver of the transfer) begs for further analysis. We proceeded to make
the di⁄erence in the sizes of T 1 and T 2 small in order to see how rel-
atively asymmetric our two regions emerged in equilibrium, under the
optimal transfer. We proceeded to set T 1 = 3:1 and T 2 = 2:9 in place
of our T 1 = 4 and T 2 = 2 above. Other parameters including the aggre-
gate endowments of labor and K￿capital remained unchanged. A larger
transfer from region 2 to region 1 emerged and the equilibrium exhibited
considerable asymmetry, with noticeably more labor and K ￿capital in
region 1. See Table 3.
Table 3
￿ S N1 K1 Utility G1 G2 C1 C2
-0.05 -0.5152168 15.0564 5.1726 0.52643 1.7652 0.7657 0.35172 0.46464
Region 1 emerged as the place with abundant local public good and
a smaller amount of per capita pricate goods consumption. Region 1
ended up with about 2/3 of the population and more than 5/8 of the
K￿capital: The large asymmetry in the equilibrium outcome "explains"
5Our computations were not satisfactory for cases of ￿ more negative than -0.05.
We infer that numerical outputs with the constant elasticity production function
"very elastic" do not compute in a straightforward way.
9in part the need for a relatively large transfer. We infer that the transfer
here is not providing "compensation" for the exogenous di⁄erence in
land endowments but is rather reinforcing the scale e⁄ect associated
with local public good provision in region 1. Roughly speaking "the
economy" can generate extra welfare at the margin by taking advantage
of the scale e⁄ect in the provision of local public goods, here in region
1, and the transfer provides an assist in generating the extra welfare.
As we observed earlier, per capita rentals in region 2 came out larger
(in region 1 the per capita rentals for K ￿capital and land were 0.08593
and 0.1675 compared with the respective values, 0.1431 and 0.2865 for
region 2). The smaller region has more "￿scal capacity" measured by per
capita rentals and does indeed end up supplying region 1 with a transfer.
The wage in region 1 emerged lower (0.183 compared with 0.294). We
infer that a small di⁄erence in local endowment T i induces "extra" labor
to the region with the larger T i and this "extra labor e⁄ect" is magni￿ed
by the "scale economy" associated with the provision of the local public
good. The more populous region can support the same Gi with lower
per capita taxes and this induces an "extra" in￿ ow of labor.
5 Optimal Population
Not surprising perhaps is the fact that familiar results from optimal pop-
ulation analyses fail to obtain in our model, with produced capital being
"spread" across our two regions. We turn to the matter of overall popula-
tion N being selected in order to maximize the utility of a representative
household. Suppose then that we have solved our six equation system
((1) to (6)), given an interior solution for "arbitrary" values for S and N:
We can in principle express each of the solved values G1;G2;N1;N2;K1
and K2 in terms of the current value of the aggregate population, N: One
then asks for a value of N that results in each of U(C1;G1) and U(C2;G2)
being a maximum, subject to G1(N);G2(N);N1(N);N2(N);K1(N) and
K2(N) satisfying the equilibrium system. We simply maximize each of
10U(C1(N);G1(N)) and U(C2(N);G2(N)) with respect to N; using equi-
librium conditions: The optimizations yield
UC1



























dN ; we can substitute and sum the two expressions
to get [FN2￿C2]+f[FN1￿C1]+FK1 dK1
dN
dN




Recall that FK1 = FK2 and [FN1 ￿ C1] = [FN2 ￿ C2] for the case of an
optimal S: Hence with both S and N selected optimally, we infer that
[FN2 ￿ C
2] = 0: (12)
And it follows that [FN1 ￿ C1] = 0: We can then infer that
G
1 + S = R
1 + K
1FK1 and [G
2 ￿ S] = R
2 + K
2FK2:
This generalizes the classic Henry George result to the case of K￿capital
and S being optimal. I like to read this as total tax obligations in each
region are covered by total rentals respectively. It follows of course that
for the marginal mover from region i to region j; the di⁄erence in per
capita tax obligations is precisely capitalized in the di⁄erence in per
capita rentals.
If the model were set up without K ￿capital; then an optimal S and
an optimal N would yield the precise Henry George result: land rent in
each region equals the net aggregate tax payment in each region.
G
1 + S = R
1 and [G
2 ￿ S] = R
2: (13)
6 Ownership Issues
Our people (households) are taken to be identical and thus besides end-
ing up with the same utility in every place, one expects that their per-
sonal endowments would be similar. The tradition we are working in
11transfers the ownership of land and capital to each resident equally when
a resident enters the region in question. This is not too bad an assump-
tion in a multi-region model. When one changes regions, one gives up
(possibly sells) one￿ s holdings in the region being departed from and
acquires (possibly buys) equal shares in the new region. The tradition
we are working in treats the departer as walking away from its "owned"
shares of land and produced capital and automatically acquiring equal
shares per capita of land and produced capital in the region being moved
to. This mechanical switching of ownership is thus not too bad a pro-
cedure for a multi-region model with all identical worker-households.
Nevertheless one wonders about the implications of property rights being
assigned at the outset and having these ownerships remain unchanged as
say the marginal worker shifts her residence from one region to another.
We will not take this "complete" ownership case up here because it is
complicated6 and what we have is fairly sensible. We can gain some in-
sight into matters of not "symmetric" ownership by simply having some
land in one region owned "abroad". This case "causes" new interesting
input pricing issues to enter into the model.
Suppose then that fraction ￿; between zero and unity, of land in
region 1 is owned abroad. Let us work through with no produced capital,
K in the model, to keep matters less cluttered. This implies that
C
1 =
F(N1;T 1) ￿ G1 ￿ S ￿ ￿T 1FT1
N1 :
We have a four equation system in G1;G2;N1 and N2: T 1 is assumed
larger than T 2: The equal utility equation is now
U
￿











We assume that we have an interior solution and that we have solved
for G1;G2;N1 and N2: As before, we can express each solution value in
6When Wildasin [1986; pp. 66-70] exposits capitalization in cities of a ￿scal
bene￿t, he assumes explicitly that his relevant workers have only wage income.
12terms of parameter S and proceed to solve for the utility maximizing
value of S; a value contingent on the values of G1;G2;N1 and N2 being





= FN2 ￿ C
2:
There is a price e⁄ect ￿T 1 dFT1
dS breaking the symmetry now. We can now
express F(N1;T 1) as N1FN1 + R1 and F(N2;T 2) as N2FN2 + R2 and
recall that C1N1+G1+S +￿T 1FT1 = F(N1;T 1) and C2N2+G2￿S =
F(N2;T 2): Then the condition for an optimal S implies that
[G1 + S] ￿ R1 + ￿T 1[FT1 ￿ N1 dFT1
dS ]
N1 =
[G2 ￿ S] ￿ R2
N2 :
Novel now is the input price-e⁄ect term, ￿T 1[FT1 ￿ N1 dFT1
dS ]: It is not
clear what the sign of this term will be in general.
Our observation now is that "arbitrary" initial ownership arrange-
ments, arrangements to maintain every household treated "equally", will
introduce many price e⁄ects into our relatively simple equilibrium rela-
tionships when we consider the switch of a marginal household from one
region to the other.7 For the marginal mover in our two region model,
we expect that the price e⁄ects caused by her move from one region to
another will tend to cancel each other out, with losses from price e⁄ects
in one region being o⁄set by gains in the other region, on average over
the two regions, household by household. Hence in a many region, many
household model set up to treat all households relatively equally, "arbi-
trary" initial and unchanging ownership assignments should not cause
large departures from the equilibrium conditions that we are obtaining.
This observation gains strength if we always consider the movement of
a marginal household from one region balanced with that of a marginal
household from the other region.
7Mansoorian and Myers [1997] introduce a preference for a particular location in
their workers and are able to work with a unique marginal worker for each region.
We could proceed in their fashion without di¢ culty.
13There is another way to think about somewhat heterogeneous own-
ership arrangements. There is nothing in our general analysis or in our
digression into outside ownership issues which suggests that anything
di⁄erent from our capitalization thinking requires serious consideration.
In particular there appears to be no opening for a consideration of free
migration equalizing net ￿scal bene￿ts in models of the kind we are
dealing with.
7 The Private Goods Case
We now have three inputs in each region: a ￿xed amount of labor to be
spread over the two regions, a ￿xed amount of produced capital K to
be spread over the two regions and a natural resource stock, say land,
T i; ￿xed in supply in each region. Assuming a transfer S given and free
mobility equalizing utility levels of people across the two regions, our
system is six equations:
U(









where U(:;:) is our positive-valued utility, increasing and concave in each
argument, with U(0;x) = U(y;0) = 0 for x and y positive values. When
a person enters region i he or she immediately begins receiving an equal
share of the local capital rent and land rent. This in a sense deprives
current residents of some income. Within each region, "prices" satisfy"
UC1 =U(G1=N1) (15)
UC2 =U(G2=N2) (16)
where UC1 indicates the derivative of the utility function with respect
to the ￿rst argument, namely C1; and so on for the other derivatives.
Produced capital is "spread" across the two regions to satisfy
FK1 = FK2: (17)
14(17) indicates the equality of rentals for K across our two regions. In







This is a six equation system in G1;G2;N1;N2;K1 and K2:
Suppose that an interior solution exists and that we have solved our
system. Each solution value can be expressed as a function of the para-
meter S as with G1(S);G2(S);N1(S);N2(S);K1(S) and K2(S) satisfy-
ing the equilibrium system. We now consider the value of the transfer S
that maximizes the representative household￿ s utility, region by region.
For each region the ￿rst order condition is
UC1



























that FK1 = FK2: Since dK2
dS = ￿dK1
dS and dS
dN2 = ￿ dS
dN1; the when we sum








Wage income net of current expenditure on consumption plus housing
is equal in region 1 to the comparable value in region 2. Since N1FN1 +
K1FK1 + R1 = N1C1 + G1 + S and N2FN2 + K2FK2 + R2 = N2C2 +







N2 : Hence the inference that the optimal
transfer, S￿ leads to the capitalization of per capita "tax" obligation
di⁄erences between regions, [ S
N1 ￿ S





15The concept of an optimal population for a multi-region economy
with purely private goods is not as straight forward as that for a multi-
region economy, each region with its own local public good. We do not
pursue the optimal population matter for the case of our economy with
only private goods.
8 Concluding Remarks
The central contribution of Flatters, Henderson and Miezkowski [1974]
was to make clear than free migration of workers among regions, each
with a local public good, would lead to outcomes that could be improved
upon by the introduction of transfers from one region to another. Here
we characterize the utility optimizing transfer in a model with K￿capital
in addition to land and observe in simulations the dramatic impact of
the scale e⁄ect in the provision of local public goods. The scale e⁄ect
turns on per capita "tax charges" being small for a given level of the local
public good in a region with a large number of workers. The scale e⁄ect is
su¢ ciently strong as to lead generally to the small region in our analysis
providing a transfer to the larger region. Thus the optimal transfer turns
out not to be a vehicle for compensating a "poor land" region for its small
endowment, rather the transfer is acting as an instrument for extending
the scale e⁄ect in the provision of a local public good. The transfer leads
to a large scale e⁄ect and more welfare at the margin for our two region
economy. Though the large population in the region with the "low per
capita cost" for the public good makes for an abundance of the local
public good in that region, it also leads to relatively low wages in that
larger region. And the smaller region ends up with relatively large per
capita rentals for land and K ￿capital and it is these per capita rentals
that contribute crucially to funding local tax charges including those
for transfers from the high per capita rental region to the other region.
Of interest then is our characterization of the optimal transfer; but of
more interest are the curious equilibrium outcomes that we simulated
16for economies with optimized transfers.
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